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Abstract: Drawing from Coase’s methodological lesson, this article discusses the specific 
case of knowledge, which was for a long time chiefly governed by exchange mechanisms lying 
outside the market, and has only recently been brought into the market. Its recent, heavy 
“colonization” by the property paradigm has progressively elicited criticism from commentators 
who, for various reasons, believe that the market can play only a limited role in pursuing 
efficiency in the knowledge domain. The article agrees with the enounced thesis and tries to 
provide an explanation of it that relates to the fact that in specific circumstances property-rights 
can produce distinct market failures that affect the social cost and can consequently prevent 
attainment of social welfare.
In particular, the arguments set forth here concern three distinct externalities that arise when 
enforcing a property rights system over knowledge. First, the existence of a property right may 
itself alter individual preferences and social norms, thus causing specific changes in individuals' 
behaviour. Second, the idiosyncratic nature of knowledge, as a collective and inherently 
indivisible entity, means that its full propertization can be expected to produce significant harm. 
Third, property rights can cause endogenous drifts in the market structure arising from the 
exclusive power granted to the right holder: though generally intended as a necessary mechanism 
for extracting a price from the consumer, in the knowledge domain property rights can become a 
device for extracting rents from the market. 
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11. Introduction 
The Problem of Social Cost (1960) is a cornerstone of law and economics analysis. In 
this contribution, Coase disclosed the full economic function of property rights, showing 
them to be not merely a means for assigning private benefits to rightful owners, but also a 
powerful device for promoting social welfare. 
This ability to align private and public interests has made property rights a valuable social 
tool. They have played--and continue to play--an important role in modern economies 
and democracies, eliciting justifiable enthusiasm among scholars and policymakers. 
However this support has in some cases tended to veer into a near-religious, dogmatic 
belief in property rights as somehow constituting a panacea for any kind of market failure 
(Porrini & Ramello, 2007). 
This dogmatic attitude has often been used to justify the reflexive creation of new 
property rights or the extension of pre-existing ones, without regard for the fact that there 
is no single best way to stimulate efficiency, since much depends on exogenous variables 
such as transaction costs, among others. 
Yet formulaic solutions are neither the usual remedy for market failures nor really in the 
spirit of Coase’s message: after all, his pathbreaking essay was intended to challenge the 
blind   enthusiasm   surrounding   Pigou’s   theoretical   support   for   state   intervention, 
reasserting a proper role for the market in promoting social welfare (Brian Simpson, 
1996).
All in all, recognising the limitations of property rights in specific situations, far from 
being a challenge to Coase’s achievement, is a manner of paying tribute to his work by 
extending our understanding of the property system's key features, and its weaknesses 
and strengths in promoting efficiency. 
This article is intended to provide further insights into the specific case of property rights 
over knowledge, a distinctive social entity that deeply characterises human relationships 
and the semantic sphere of human groups. Though knowledge was for a long time chiefly 
governed by exchange mechanisms lying outside the market, it is now being increasingly 
assimilated to other commodified resources, and being made a target of specific property 
rights,   labelled   “intellectual”
1.   This   recent,   heavy   “colonization”   by   the   property 
paradigm has progressively elicited criticism from commentators who, for various 
reasons, believe that the market can play only a limited role in pursuing efficiency in the 
knowledge domain. 
The arguments set forth here concern three distinct problems that arise when enforcing a 
property rights system in the knowledge domain. First, the existence of a property right 
may itself shape individual preferences and social norms, thus causing specific changes 
in individuals' behaviour. Second, the idiosyncratic nature of knowledge, as a collective 
and inherently indivisible entity, means that its full propertization can be expected to 
produce significant harm. Third, property rights can produce endogenous drifts in the 
1 Whether intellectual property rights should be assimilated to tangible property is a question that has been 
hotly debated by scholars. See for instance, for patents, Bessen and Meurer (2009) and the references 
herein. However the rhetoric surrounding intellectual property, and the language which it employs, try to 
assimilate it to conventional property. What is more, many laws give IPRs the status of property; the British 
Copyright, Design and Patent Act (CDPA) 1988 in section 1(1) expressly asserts: “‘Copyright is a property 
right which subsists in accordance with this Part in the following descriptions of work […]”.
 
2market structure arising from the exclusive power granted to the right holder: though 
generally intended as a necessary mechanism for extracting a price from the consumer, in 
the knowledge domain property rights can become a device for extracting rents from the 
market.
In all three of these cases, property-right dynamics produce distinct market failures that 
affect the social cost and can consequently prevent attainment of social welfare. 
Although the aim of this article is to provide a positive rather than a normative analysis, 
some normative implications do indirectly emerge from the discussion.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 briefly reviews the 
meaning   and   the   role   of   property   rights,   introducing   the   topic   of   property-right 
externalities in the knowledge domain; section 3 presents the first effects that a property 
regime can have on individual behaviour and on efficiency; sections 4 and 5 take this 
argument further by discussing, on the one hand, the social nature of knowledge, the 
collective dimension of its production, and the consequences of exclusive rights upon it, 
and on the other hand the rent-seeking incentives created by intellectual property rights 
and their impact on the market structure; finally section 6 presents the conclusions.
2. Property rights, resources and production of externalities
Property rights are a universal feature of social interactions, albeit one 
that sometimes exhibits distinctive traits in different human groups. 
The social dimension and the attributes of goods are the natural 
elements   which   led   to   the   spontaneous   emergence   of  de   facto 
property rights, even in the absence of a substantive law (Porrini & 
Ramello, 2007). 
The need for strong, secure property rights later intensified with the 
evolution and development of economic activities, with their role in 
social contexts crucially driven by the concept of scarcity (Levmore, 
2002). As pointed out by Demsetz (1967, p. 347) “[i]n the world of 
Robinson Crusoe property rights play no role”. The existence of a 
property  right thus presupposes that a number of individuals are 
competing to access a given resource, thereby creating a need for a 
system for allotting that resource. In many cases, the proper solution is 
the market. Property rights thus arise out of certain attributes of private goods--i.e. 
rivalry and excludability–which call for a system for regulating the possible uses of a 
given subject matter. A person eating an apple, for example, automatically enforces a 
property right over it merely through use, even in the absence an explicit statutory 
arrangement, by the act of consuming the good and/or excluding others from doing so. 
Such an individual could equally decide to sell the apple, or to give it away as a present, 
and the previous assertion would remain valid; and this same rationale will continue to 
apply even in cases where technical change makes possible new uses, new goods and 
new markets.
We can thus see how de facto property rights predate any property law, and why any 
legal amendments to them would not ordinarily affect the valuation of the good or the 
behaviour of the owner. All in all, the rights were in most cases neutral with respect to 
3the resources: it was the subject matter which motivated the emergence of the property 
right, and not vice versa. Their proper statutory design then consisted in better defining 
the right, and  internalizing externalities, to allow the market to work.
Empirical studies provide abundant evidence that strong property regimes have in many 
cases been central to promoting markets, investments, and economic growth. These 
results mostly apply to the domain of tangible property, and cannot be easily disputed. 
However, in other specific domains--such as knowledge--the positive evidence is not so 
robust, and it appears even that strong property rights can have a counterproductive 
outcome (Bessen & Meurer, 2008). This occurs according to the arguments raised in the 
next pages, when the system of property rights re-shapes the framework in which it is 
deployed, so that the mere fact of its introduction gives rise to new externalities which 
endemically affect welfare. Such externalities are not simply changes in allocation of the 
resource driven by the property system, which are of course part of the economic 
dynamics and beneficial in terms of efficiency; rather, they represent direct spillovers of 
the property regime that can provoke specific market failures. This can lead to the 
emergence of a new social cost, spawned by the property system itself, and possibly 
affecting the final welfare balance.
The above-described mechanisms seem particularly (though not solely) applicable to the 
knowledge domain, with a number of distinct consequences affecting social welfare. 
First, the property regime and its modifications may alter the attitudes and preferences of 
social agents, and hence their choices. Second, it may have consequences on the 
production of knowledge, by severely impairing its productive organization which is 
heavily reliant on the collective sphere. Third, it may cause rent-seeking drifts to arise, by 
creating opportunities for right holders to variously exploit the exclusive power arising 
from the property right, with repercussions on the market structure and on economic 
performance. 
These three consequences represent distinct externalities produced by the property-rights 
regime, whose attendant social costs may partially or completely negate the ability of 
property to foster efficiency. Such a dysfunction may be countered either through ex-post 
regulatory intervention–such as access mandated by the government or court rulings--or 
through the ex-ante abandonment of the property rights system in favour of a different 
allocative solution--such as that discussed below for the case of collective invention. In 
either case, however, the insights of Coase and Pigou become complementary, rather than 
mutually exclusive. The three identified externalities of property rights over knowledge 
are discussed separately in the following three sections. 
3. Dynamic effects of property on individual preferences and on social norms
The first externality arises from the ability of the property regime to alter individuals' 
attitudes to specific subject matters. Naturally, if the attitude change occurs because 
technological   change   has   either   created   new   goods   or   new   opportunities   for 
appropriation, or rendered already-existing resources valuable, it can be treated as the 
emergence of a new market, and readily justified on the usual efficiency grounds as 
4discussed by Demsetz (1967)
2. However, in certain circumstances individuals may 
change their behaviour merely because the emphasis created by the property system has 
altered their mindset toward a specific activity, which they previously engaged in with 
less regard to appropriation via property rights.
3.1 The example of property over science
A case in point is that of science, where the increasing prominence given to the patent 
system has substantially changed the attitude of many researchers, to the point of having 
tangible consequences on the organisation of the scientific community and its ‘openness’ 
regime, which have in turn affected the circulation and accessibility of scientific data 
(Nelson, 2004; Ramello, 2005a; Haeussler, 2010). One example is the widespread effect 
on academic institutions of the amendment of the Bayh-Dole Act (1980)
3, aimed at 
strengthening university patenting, which produced a drift toward patenting or enforcing 
patents on discoveries that would formerly have been made widely accessible to the 
scientific community
4.
Though the outcomes are in many respects somewhat puzzling, recent evidence suggests 
that increased patenting by academic researchers may slow and sometimes even halt 
innovation, due to the restrictions it places on the diffusion
  and use of upstream 
knowledge (Verspagen, 2006; Fabrizio, 2007). This is a vital question because, even 
though scientific achievements can sometimes benefit from the economic incentives 
provided to private individuals and firms by the patent system
5, they rely greatly on the 
process of free sharing, and on the wide accessibility of a broad base of previously-
created knowledge. This is the arrangement that has traditionally underpinned the 
scientific community, according to a paradigm of substantial openness that has been 
imaginatively termed the “Republic of Science” (Polanyi, 1962). It can be summarised as 
the form of organisation spontaneously emerging in science, which has characterised the 
production of scientific knowledge in such a way that--as we shall later discuss--it 
becomes itself part of the engine that makes possible the production of new knowledge 
(Nelson, 2004; Ramello, 2005a & 2005b).
That is not to say that science has ever been totally extraneous to propertization; there 
have been a number of solutions permitting (partial) appropriation by researchers in order 
to extract some private benefit from their activity. Secrecy was--and still is--one way to 
enforce some exclusion; but it has the weakness that secrets are difficult to keep and can 
in some cases be reverse engineered. Also, they cannot assure very strong exclusive 
2 Consider for instance a new mining technique that makes it possible to exploit previously inaccessible 
resources, or a novel use of a previously unexploited factor for producing a good. A similar dynamics can 
take place when there are externalities between new and pre-existing goods so that preferences changes can 
be ascribed to the choice set changes. But of course in this case the property rights is neutral, the changes 
depend on innovation and the subsequent substitution between old and new goods.
3 Among other things, it strengthened US universities' control over internal inventions and other intellectual 
property rights that resulted from such funding. Sponsored by the senators Bayh and Dole, the act was 
amended by the US Congress on December 12, 1980.
4 Although science provides a good example, it is not the only case. Another example is copyright, with 
many religions having recently decided to strengthen the protection and the enforcement of already-existing 
copyrights on various religious texts in order to extract rents (Marchese & Ramello, 2010). 
5 Especially in the case of applied and directly market-oriented research (David & Dasgupta, 1994; Nelson, 
2004).
5rights, since nothing prevents separate individuals from unwittingly owning the same 
secret (Samuelson, 2000). All in all, a multitude of spillovers are likely to occur 
(Frischmann & Lemley, 2007).
Reputation has provided another powerful means for researchers to capture some benefits 
(in many cases even pecuniary benefits) from their work without restricting others' access 
to new data, thereby preserving the Republic of Science
6. The prompt availability to the 
scientific community of newly created knowledge and its ensuing validation, e.g. through 
publication in peer-reviewed journals, has been a crucial reputation building mechanism 
that perfectly aligns (from a Coasean perspective) the private incentives for scientists 
with the public interest of society and the community, while at the same time enhancing 
the circulation of new ideas (Spier, 2002; Ramello, 2010)
7.
What is more, up until recently, even though patents were available and exploited to 
provide an extra incentive for fostering inventions and discoveries, a suitable balance 
between openness and enclosure was generally struck through adherence to a social 
norm, so that the peculiar productive organization of the scientific community was not 
disrupted. Indeed, according to empirical investigations the propensity of researchers to 
actively participate in the community and share information can be affected by changes 
in the social norms that govern their activity and it further explains the changes affecting 
individual preferences (Haeussler, 2010).
3.2 Laws, social norms and individual behaviour
The past three decades have seen a progressive erosion of openness in favour of 
enclosure, often driven by an unquestioning reliance on the dogmatic (and thus, it must 
be emphasised, non Coasean) tenet that property rights are always beneficial in terms of 
efficiency. 
This drift in the norm-based relationships of the scientific community may change the 
attitude of individuals, and what they are willing to produce for the existing incentives, so 
that the possibility of extracting new benefits causes a shift in their behaviour. Since this 
will essentially involve exercising the exclusive power provided by patent law, it will in 
turn affect the accessibility of previous knowledge.
It should be emphasised once again that the described behavioural shift does not arise out 
of any new opportunities for appropriation, but only from transformations in the 
prevailing social norms of the scientific community (Haeussler, 2010)
8. We can thus 
regard this outcome as an externality of the property regime affecting the social norms 
6 The same holds true in many creative and efficient milieus in which a “democratic” structure prevails 
without the market, and even in the absence of any direct monetary reward. A well known example is 
provided by the open source community where “[…] though some participants do focus on long-term 
appropriation through money-oriented activities, like consulting or service contracts […] the critical mass 
of participation in projects cannot be explained by the direct presence of a price or even a future monetary 
return” (Benkler, 2006, p. 60).
7 The same also characterises different productive domains such as, for instance, open source software 
(Benkler, 2006).
8 The assertion can be extended to other creative domains. For copyright and software see, for instance, 
Benkler (2006, chap. 4), who discusses in depth the social relations within the programmers' community 
and the consequences upon it of the price system.
6governing researchers, which had formed part of the system of incentives and governance 
of the scientific community.
Many scientist have now begun to patent--or to more strictly enforce already-existing 
patents--in situations where access would formerly have been kept open, pursuing a 
strategy of securing ex-ante any possible additional revenues accruing from their work. 
However the goal of this new behaviour is not to reward inventive activity through 
property, but merely to exploit the possibility of gaining some ex-post extra monetary 
benefits. It is thus a rent-seeking attitude, in the event that some good will shows up, and 
of course has the added consequence of slowing the circulation of newly created 
knowledge, by postponing the publication of results. 
Surveys conducted in the life-sciences community have shown, for instance, that the 
modern patenting strategy, directed at assuring better appropriation, has delayed the 
disclosure of scientific outcomes by at least six months on average
9. What is more, 
approximately half of the respondents said they had in many cases been unable to pursue 
specific incremental research and/or verify results reported by others, because access to 
the necessary details or data was denied (Blumenthal et al, 1997; Campbell et al., 2002). 
This situation represents  the other side of the coin: the reduced accessibility of 
knowledge   determined   by   stronger   property   rights   makes   the   life   of   subsequent 
researchers more difficult, by increasing the cost of inputs and of sequential knowledge 
development. In a world of perfect information, this would not be a problem since ex-
post profitability would make it possible to recover the ex-ante access costs. However 
scientific research-- and especially basic research--often follows the erratic dynamics of a 
random walk, i.e. of advancement through trial and error, which can blur any economic 
prospecting (Merton,1973). That is why the social norms governing the community were 
originally preferred over a market mechanism.
Furthermore, the need for firms to obtain near-immediate returns on investments–e.g. 
within the managers' mandate for having their appointments renewed--makes them 
unable to sustain a high level of risk, and orients them toward specific short-run 
profitable research that does not permit path-breaking discoveries, due to market-imposed 
limitations (Dasgupta and David, 1994). 
Many researchers and scientific institutions (e.g. NIH) in the medical field have reported 
that broad basic patents have actually made their work more difficult, by raising the costs 
of inputs and in some cases substantially impairing their ability to undertake sequential 
development of knowledge (Mertz et al., 2002; Williams 2010). 
The above trends, taken together, are affecting the performance of the Republic of 
Science as a social productive technology. The interesting point to note is that the 
extension of property rights in the science domain has been somewhat blurred in its 
effects, since it interferes with the productive ability of other researchers and thus impairs 
the productive role of the scientific community intended as a collective productive 
technology. This is a different kind of externality that will be tackled in the next section.
4. The collective dimension of knowledge production
9 A current routine of university patent boards, as experienced by the author himself as a member of his 
University's patent committee, is to remind researchers to carefully avoid any presentation or publication of 
results before having successfully filed a patent request, as otherwise the attribute of “novelty” would no 
longer hold true for the would-be patented idea.
7The connection between knowledge and the social structure is not one that arises by 
chance: they are in fact intrinsically related, because knowledge is a social entity 
pertaining to human relationships and the semantic sphere of human groups
10. Knowledge 
belongs to the collective contexts in which it is created. It is brought to fruition in the 
symbolic sphere defined by society and renewed through sharing, which is thus an 
indispensable prerequisite for individuals' creative activities (Ramello, 2005b & 2008). 
Even though the creation of knowledge can be partially ascribed to individual efforts, it 
cannot be fully understood and explained outside the social dimension. Its existence and 
production necessarily rely upon communities, in a decentralized system whereby inputs 
and outputs are shared, freely or conditionally. Knowledge production thus has a 
pervasively decentralized organisation in which--though individual agents do play a 
role--the total output depends upon the collective effort
11. In other words, even though we 
can zoom in to perceive individual contributions at the micro level, the process and its 
output can only fully be understood from a macro perspective which reveals their 
interdependent actions (Weitzmann, 1998). 
4.1  Idiosyncratic features of a social technology
The point to be taken here is that knowledge does not fit into the standard representation 
of commodities and goods, since it exhibits idiosyncratic features connected with its 
inherently social nature.
Our understanding of knowledge has been growing clearer as various contributions from 
different social sciences have identified the characteristics of this elusive entity, that is at 
the same time both a resource and a process marked by complex dynamics. The best 
definition formulated thus far by economists is that given by Martin Weitzman (1998), 
who in an imaginative essay, inspired by Schumpeter’s (1934) insight, argued against 
modelling knowledge advances as if they were comparable to other manufacturing 
activities, or to prospecting for natural resources. “[...S]omething fundamentally different 
is involved here. When research effort is applied, new ideas arise out of existing ideas in 
some kind of cumulative interactive process that intuitively seems somewhat different 
from prospecting petroleum.” (Weitzmann, 1998, p. 332; the italics are mine)
12. 
This process, labelled “recombinant innovation”, is cumulative, interactive, and hence 
inextricably social, despite relying upon a sum of individual contributions. 
A good analogy for understanding what is involved here is Aristotle's explanation of the peculiar and 
seminal features of democracy, whose overall accomplishments far exceed the sum of the abilities and 
virtues of its individual participants: 
10 For an in depth discussion of the idiosyncratic nature of knowledge as a social entity see Ramello (2008) 
and the references therein.
11 Ref. for example to Benkler (2006) for the software domain. However it is also valid in general for the 
production of knowledge. The economics literature provides a number of examples of innovation outcomes 
in the case of collective invention, that will be discussed further on. See for instance Allen (1983), McGaw 
(1987), von Hippel (2005).
12 A similar dynamic was earlier set forth and adopted by Boulding (1955, p. 103-104): “ We cannot regard 
knowledge as simply the accumulation of information in a stockpile, even though all the messages that are 
received by the brain may leave some sort of deposit here. Knowledge must itself be regarded as a 
structure, a very complex and quite loose pattern with its parts connected in various ways by ties of varying 
degrees of strength.”
8“For it is possible that the many, though not individually good men, yet when they come 
together may be better, not individually but collectively, than those who are so, just as 
public dinners to which many contribute are better than those supplied at one man's cost 
[…]” Aristotle (1944, book 3 1281b) .
Such an outcome emanates from the special features of the collective dimension, and 
exhibits a phenomenon similar to what economists would term economies of scale, with 
respect to the number of individuals involved in the process. 
While we are accustomed to seeing a similar dynamic in consumption, with demand 
network externalities occurring when the value of a consumed good is dependent on 
positive externalities created by others’ consumption (Katz & Shapiro, 1985), the same 
may well also apply to the production of certain resources, susceptible to what we might 
term supply network externalities. 
This hypothesis is borne out by much factual evidence relating to knowledge. There are 
examples from ancient times of many spectacular achievements that were made possible 
by a social “cumulative interactive” productive organisation. The Maya, for example, 
were able to devise an accurate system for measuring time and excelled in astronomy 
thanks to a collective intelligence built up over the course of successive generations by a 
number of individuals, all of whom were able to abundantly access the previously-
produced knowledge, thus making it possible to refine and improve upon it (Thompson, 
1961).
More recently, even in the history of western industry, there have likewise been many 
examples in which the social structure and the sharing of knowledge have fostered 
important achievements. Indeed, the wide accessibility of knowledge and a cooperative, 
decentralised structure are at the root of the many instances of what Allen (1983) terms 
“collective  invention”,  in which the  collective  intelligence  provided by a widely 
participative and non-proprietary structure of individuals or firms has made possible 
notable   achievements,   including   among   others   the   development   of  efficient   blast 
furnaces, the mechanisation of paper manufacture, and more recently the development of 
the techniques and equipment of high-performance windsurfing (Allen, 1983; McGaw, 
1987; von Hippel, 2005). Even the production of legal precedents, which represent a by-
product of dispute resolution, can be regarded as a form of collective invention which, for 
reasons connected with the specific needs of judicial decision-making and economic 
efficiency, has rejected the market analogy and preferred that of social production 
although by a community of specialists (Harnay & Marciano, 2007).
There is also evidence in support of the counterfactual, demonstrating how the property 
system has directly hampered innovation, and how dismissing the property paradigm has 
actually reversed that failure. For example, analysing the dynamics of technological 
change in the Cornish mining district, Nuvolari (2004) shows how establishing a 
collective invention setting proved crucial for resuming innovation, following the 
expiration of the Watt and Boulton patent on the steam engine. The free sharing among 
firms of detailed information about the design and performance of the newly introduced 
technologies, which provided voluntary knowledge spillovers to anyone willing to access 
to them (even outside the Cornish district), was the main driver for overcoming the slow 
pace of technological change impressed by aggressive exploitation of the Watt and 
9Boulton patent. The decision to shift inventive activity out of the proprietary system was 
decisive for dramatically accelerating the pace of development of the steam engine.
Another more recent illustration of the potential of collective invention is provided by 
free software. In this case the property right implicated is chiefly copyright, although 
patents have also sometimes entered the scene. There is extensive evidence that this 
collective, non-proprietary productive structure has led to the development of many 
important products widely used today, especially in the Internet domain
13. 
The most celebrated case of course is that of open source software, which is developed 
through a non-market and non-hierarchical productive organisation. According to various 
commentators, many of its achievements would not have been possible in a proprietary 
regime (Benkler,2006). However it is worth noting that in order to allow the social 
domain to re-enter a scene heavily colonised by the market and copyright, some 
additional costs have to be borne. In practice, this is accomplished through contractual 
agreements, informally known as “copyleft”, designed to collapse the exclusive power 
associated with property rights by obliging follow-on creators to preserve the full 
accessibility of the material accessed and further developed
14.
In other words, a bizarre contractual arrangement by the first copyright holder is needed 
to neutralise  the subsequent  temptations  to propertize  the subject  matter  and its 
incremental developments. Here again, the aim is to preserve the cumulative interactive 
production.
4.2 The puzzle of knowledge indivisibility and propertization 
In all the cited cases, a pattern emerges in which the property regime is unable to 
maximise social welfare, due to a fundamental divergence between the sum of individual 
private benefits and the collective dimension. In this case, there is a failure of the 
property system, and the atomisation entailed by the appropriation mechanism is likely to 
produce externalities. These might be avoided if a single property right could encompass 
and fully internalize the entire resource, thus allowing the Coasean paradigm to function 
properly. However this is impossible in the case of knowledge, which has an intrinsically 
social nature which full private appropriation would inevitably hamper
15. 
In describing the peculiar situation of knowledge, we earlier introduced the concept of 
economies of scale with respect to the number of individuals involved. This seems to be 
an apt representation of the knowledge-production function, and also  yields some clues 
as to why property rights might cause--rather than resolve--market failures in the 
knowledge domain. 
To address this question we must refer back to a well-known problem in economics: that 
of indivisibility, which arises--among others--in the case of economies of scale (or 
13  Just a couple of examples: the famous Linux operating system is installed on many computers -- 
including those of Amazon, Google and CNN.com – and is additionally an important learning tool for 
developers and students because of its accessible open source structure; what is more today about 70% of 
web servers also run another opens source product, the free Apache software (Benkler, 2006).
14 For a general reference see: http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/ 
15 The same solution is put forward by Liebowitz & Margolis (1994) for overcoming the demand-side 
market failure arising from network externalities. This work includes an interesting short reference 
concerning non-propertizable resources: in such a case the authors propose a solution which is social – and 
non market based -- in its essence.
10scope), and makes it impossible to rely on the competitive market for optimal allocation 
of resources (Edwards & Starr, 1984). Furthermore, the essence of economies of scale 
consists in “the presence of large and significant indivisibilities in production” (Scarf, 
1994, p. 115) since otherwise–i.e. with continual returns to scale–there would be  no need 
to employ a large productive hierarchy.
Therefore,   indivisibilities   play   a   prominent   part   in   understanding   the   industrial 
organization, and of course likewise affect the market structure. Now, an important 
stream of economics literature, including the influential essays by Coase himself (1937) 
and those of his student and Nobel laureate Oliver Williamson (1985), has devoted much 
effort to explaining the evolving nature of the boundaries between the firm and the 
market, showing that fully internalizing externalities may in some cases require shifting 
the productive activity out of the market and into the hierarchy of the firm. 
Yet the arguments set forth previously show that in some cases neither the firm nor the 
market can fully internalise the externalities arising from the social dimension; when this 
happens, only the collective organization can provide a solution. The main cause of such 
a situation arising has to do with the imperfect appropriability associated with the 
problem of indivisibility. Though knowledge can to some extent be appropriated through 
specific objects or embodiments (in the case of copyright, expressions of ideas such 
literary texts, written music, written software codes etc.), these are imperfect entities 
because they contain much more than a clearly-delimited and indivisible “piece” of 
knowledge. Just as conventional economies of scale prevent the fragmentation of 
technology into smaller units, economies of scale relating to the number of individuals do 
not allow knowledge to be split into elementary units the sum of which will give back the 
original entity. Furthermore, this division will inhibit the social productive technology.
Consequently, the legal technology for the demarcation of knowledge is imperfect: it may 
appropriate something less, producing positive spillovers for society, but it may also 
appropriate   something   more,   producing   negative   externalities   for   society.   This 
imprecision itself tends to work against efficiency, as land demarcation has taught us
16.
Interestingly, this is an issue that was already well known at least as far back as the 19th 
century, when Coase’s fellow citizen, the English copyright scholar Augustin Birrell, 
observed that the claim that “a particular leg of mutton is mine is capable of easy proof or 
disproof, but how much of my book is mine is a nice question” (Goldstein, 1994, p. 4). 
Aside from the problem of possible legal disputes, the point here is that the legacy of 
previous knowledge is impossible to neatly excise, and anyhow amounts to much more 
than a mere sum of its inputs. If knowledge production can be thought of in terms of 
economies of scale arising from the number of individuals taking part in the process, then 
the indivisibility of knowledge must characterise both the process and the resource, so 
that any attempts to break it down into fragments and make these the subject of property 
rights will necessarily be imperfect. 
The literature on economics of innovation has, to date, focused chiefly on knowledge 
spillovers, that is to say on the positive externalities affecting the circulation of 
knowledge, which represent a valuable non-market exchange that, for example, accounts 
for the localisation of production and the emergence of industrial clusters (Breschi & 
16 Empirical evidence show that the comparative limitations of certain land demarcation systems seem to 
have negative long-term effects on land values and economic activity in the area concerned (Libecap & 
Lueck, 2009).
11Lissoni, 2001; Frischmann & Lemley, 2007). This in itself testifies to the inability of 
property to internalise the social value of innovation, so that some additional governance 
is called for. However, since the boundaries of property rights in the knowledge domain 
are elastic and somewhat blurred due to the indivisibility problem, they can likewise be 
stretched in the direction of appropriating more than the socially optimal value. Full 
appropriation, where it is possible, must necessarily extend beyond the subject matter, 
thereby implying over-appropriation
17.
Because knowledge exists and is produced through a technology reliant on economies of 
scale in its contributors, internalising it so that ownership can be assigned to a single 
individual is by definition impossible without damaging the technology itself and its 
productivity–consequences which would then constitute a new social cost.
To summarise, in certain circumstances the market or the hierarchy may provide the best 
solution for fostering efficiency; however there are cases where neither the former nor the 
latter respond properly. When this happens, though some role for the market remains 
possible, there is also a need to broadly protect the social dimension intended as a 
productive technology which is complementary to the market. This is in essence implies 
regulation, so that in the knowledge domain Coase to some extent meets Pigou.
5. Property rights and market structure
The property paradigm of intellectual property is essentially exclusionary. Such rights are 
in fact designed to give inventors/creators--or most often licensors–the power to ask a 
positive price to pay back production cost and to obtain a reward for their work. In this 
respect, intellectual property rights treat knowledge as a commodity that mimics the 
conventional, tangible, ones (Ramello, 2008). 
However, unlike for many other goods where the exclusive right generally affects the 
demand side, by excluding consumers who are not willing to pay the price, for property 
in the knowledge domain the exclusionary power somewhat overlaps the supply side, 
because it can in many circumstances be leveraged to produce rents.
5.1 Knowledge and market power
The associated behavioural changes arise directly from the possibility of affecting the 
competitive process and the market structure via property rights. Though such an 
opportunity is not restricted to knowledge, it is more easily exploitable for this particular 
commodity by reason of its flexible boundaries, which can in a sense can be stretched 
beyond the subject matter to also gain control of the market or at least of significant part 
of it. In the knowledge domain, property rights can be more easily directed to extracting 
the additional benefits arising from the strategic uses engendered by the exclusive right. 
Such profits can be extracted in a variety of ways, all somewhat related to the degree of 
market power provided by a successful intellectual property right. 
17 There is only one situation in which property rights will produce an efficient market solution, and namely 
that where the boundaries of property correspond to the total resource. This case has been discussed by 
Coase (1974) with the example of the lighthouse. However that situation cannot be mapped onto the 
knowledge domain, where contributions necessarily come from different individuals,  so that a monopoly 
cannot be envisaged.
12The above assertion is of course not obvious, and should be at least briefly clarified. In 
fact, though the mere existence of an intellectual property right, does not necessarily 
confer any significant market power to the right-holder, the success on the market of a 
given subject matter (such as a best selling book or a blockbuster drug) and its exclusive 
exploitation are likely to produce some market power
18. Hence, in the knowledge domain, 
the legal monopoly created by the property right can potentially be leveraged into an 
economic monopoly, or something close to it (Ramello, 2005b & 2008). This is at least a 
possibility for those intellectual property rights that have behavioural consequences: 
whenever some market power is put in the hands of right-holders, it may result in rent-
seeking behaviours, which are thus specific spillovers of the property regime and, as is 
well known, detract from efficiency. 
One way of rent-seeking through property consists of using the right as a sort of veto 
power aimed solely at extracting rents from the market. In this case, the exclusive right 
associated with property becomes merely a private taxation system, which neither 
promotes efficiency nor encourages the innovative effort, but only serves to produce rents 
by exploiting the shortcomings within the market itself (Marchese & Ramello, 2010). 
This type of taxation becomes a social cost when it influences the allocation of resources.
A recent example of the above is provided by patent trolls. These are firms that legally 
hold a portfolio of patents, essentially for the sole purpose of exploiting the attendant 
exclusive rights over knowledge to gain monetary benefits. Patent troll firms have no 
interest in actually using the patents themselves, which they generally simply purchase on 
the market, but only in reaping large sums of money from litigation, which thus becomes 
their productive activity (Bilton, 2010).
The  chief activity of the patent trolls thus consists of filing, or threatening to file, 
frivolous lawsuits for patent infringement against major players, who have much to lose 
from these and are accordingly apt to settle out of court, producing stream of rents for the 
plaintiff. A good example of this was the Blackberry case, in which the producer, 
Canada's Research in Motion, agreed to settle and pay the plaintiff, patent-holding firm 
NTP, over US $ 612 million to avoid the cost of shutting down its communication system 
whilst awaiting the judicial decision (Gregory, 2007).
The paradox here is that the property rights owned by the patent troll are legal, and the 
claim against the defendant is non-trivial, because the boundaries of patent, though they 
should be sharply defined by the Patent Office, are always partially blurred to some 
extent, due to the afore-mentioned problems of demarcation. This makes almost any 
threat of a lawsuit credible (Gilbert, 2010).
Such behaviour is essentially made possible, on one hand, by the role of knowledge as an 
input for ensuing activities, and on the other hand by the potential degree of market 
power created by the intellectual property right, which entitles the owner  to exclude 
downstream or competing firms if they do not pay a price. 
5.2 Industry regularities: foreclosure and concentration
18 Several arguments support this assertion and are extensively discussed in Ramello (2008). Among others, 
the problem is connected with the uniqueness of successful subject matters, which is also the reason why 
they are deemed to merit a specific property right. In fact, envisaging a competitive market would imply 
perfect substitutability among subject matters, at which point it would make no sense to invent a complex 
legal apparatus for fostering innovation, since it would be more efficient to directly finance an individual 
inventor.
13Another possibility is for this price selectively to be raised infinitely high. In such a case 
the outcome of exploiting the exclusive right will be foreclosure of the market to 
competitors, and the permission to comfortably extract rents from consumers
19. Property 
over   knowledge   becomes   thus   a   somewhat   plastic   market   device   that   can   be 
endogenously manipulated to exploit and extend market power. 
There is abundant factual evidence of this, from a wide spectrum of industries. Thomas 
Alva Edison, a prolific creator of inventions and profitable business strategies, appears to 
have shown the way in pursuing rent-seeking through leveraging and aggregation of 
intellectual property rights. In the case of the electric lamp industry, he undertook an 
aggressive campaign—which was later continued by his successors--of heavily exploiting 
patents. This included “vigorous acquisition of other inventors’ key patents, restrictive 
cross-licensing of patents when outright acquisition was not possible, mergers with 
competing companies producing electric lamps and ancillary equipment and leveraging a 
powerful patent position to organize both national and international cartels” (Scherer, 
2005, p. 298). By 1896, in just a few decades, Edison’s Company General Electric and its 
cross-licensees thus comfortably dominated more than 75% of the US market. 
A recapitulation of General Electric's conduct would provide sufficient material for 
nearly a complete course on antitrust, in addition to demonstrating the inexhaustible and 
multifaceted   richness   of   Edison's   creative   vein   even   from   the   anti-competitive 
perspective. However such a discussion would be well outside the scope of this article. 
Suffice to say that this example clearly shows how property rights over knowledge can be 
used to influence competition in many ways. 
The example of the Cornish steam engine cited earlier showed how, for the duration of its 
validity, the Watt and Boulton patent blocked the entry of competitors (Nuvolari, 2004); 
the electric lamp example further shows how such power can be consciously leveraged to 
transform competition in the market into competition for the market, leaving the winner 
in a very comfortable position for extracting rents—albeit at a cost to society.
Experiences in the pharmaceutical industry likewise indicate that patents have sometimes 
been used to restrain competition and delay the entry of competing products such as 
generic drugs (Correa, 2004). It is furthermore worth noting that concentration is a salient 
characteristic of the pharmaceutical industry, and that this feature is seen to recur very 
often today in industries governed by intellectual property.
In fact, turning now for example to another sphere governed by copyright, and one which 
is more familiar to academics, we find a very similar situation. Today's journal publishing 
industry is characterised by a complex strategy of reputation inertia, bundling and 
exclusion, which has over the past two decades led to dramatic price increases–from 3 to 
8 times the rise in the consumer price index over the same period, depending on the 
field–and a remarkably rapid concentration of the industry into the hands of a few 
commercial players, at the expense of small competitors even when the latter charged 
lower subscription rates (Ramello, 2010). 
Here again, as in the cases of the electric lamp and pharmaceutical industries, we see a 
similar pattern of aggregation of property. Indeed, aggregation of a large number of 
19 The argument made here concerns exclusionary pricing. In point of fact, monopolistic pricing cannot 
generally be infinitely high; accordingly, such pricing should not be considered a genuine profit-
maximizing choice, but rather a way for engendering market foreclosure with inherently welfare-reducing 
consequences.   
14intellectual  property rights  can represent a strategy for controlling  the market, a 
hypothesis supported by theory in both the patent and copyright domains. For example 
certain practices, such as the systematic acquisition of unexploited patents--commonly 
known as “sleeping patents”--have had in a number of cases the true purpose of 
restricting competition from newcomers (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982). Occasionally,  in a 
similar vein an incumbent might choose to work around a principal patent rather than 
paying--a practice known as “inventing around”--thus making unproductive investments 
with the sole purpose of producing sleeping patents and thereby locking out the 
competition.  
In the case of copyright, a correspondent situation has arisen in several industries where a 
few incumbents own very large catalogues of copyrighted works (e.g. recording, film, 
publishing and other industry sectors). These situations are best understood in terms of a 
defensive   leveraging   strategy,   specifically   aimed   at   preserving  and  extending  the 
incumbent's market power by increasing the asymmetry of costs and benefits between 
incumbents and new entrants (Nicita and Ramello, 2007). 
The final outcome of the aggregation of rights described above is to create a highly 
concentrated industry, in which a handful of players control the market; and since the 
investments made to achieve this market structure are non-productive, they constitute not 
just a dissipation of rents but also an additional social cost associated to market power.
All in all, the examples of rent-seeking drifts connected with property over knowledge 
are too numerous not to be correlated with the legal framework upon which the industry 
relies, namely intellectual property rights. In observing the real economic life of these 
property rights within specific markets, an interesting feature emerges: they provide 
incentives that far exceed simply rewarding creative activities, and affect rent-seeking. 
Very often, the net resultant of these forces is a tendency toward concentration within the 
industry, and a weakening of competition with repercussions on efficiency. This of 
course opens the door to a wider discussion of the dynamic effects of intellectual property 
rights on the innovation race, on rent-seeking behaviour and on the structure of the 
market. This question is very complex, and would require a much more detailed analysis. 
However, there is no doubt that the exclusive rights connected with intellectual property 
have in some cases been used to achieve or extend market power, to the detriment of the 
collective welfare. Such occurrences raise a new issue concerning property rights and 
knowledge, and namely the problem of the social cost of induced market power in these 
industries. This induced market power represents yet another new externality, engendered 
by the opportunities created by the property regime, and which in its turn affects 
efficiency. 
In many cases, regulatory arrangements can be adopted to overcome the attendant social 
costs, such as compulsory licensing, or strong antitrust interventions. 
6. Concluding remakrs
Property rights play a crucial role in economic activities: that much is out of the question. 
They are a keystone of the market, which undeniably could not exist without them, to the 
point that much of what we term ‘economy’ could not happen in their absence, or at least 
not as we currently know it. 
15However they are much more than simply a tool for making an economy and exchanges 
workable:  they are also a formidable device for broadly serving society by fostering 
efficiency through the alignment of private benefits with the public interest. In pursuing 
their profits, right-holders also accomplish the efficient allocation of a resource, thereby 
serving social welfare in a manner very much aligned with the totemic paradigm of 
economic theory: the invisible hand. This is an insight that greatly furthered our 
understanding of this legal institution, and represents a milestone in the economics 
literature of the past century. However it is only one among the many merits of Ronald 
Coase. 
The English Nobel Laureate in fact also taught us a great deal more: for example to look 
in general at all laws and institutions as potentially powerful devices for promoting 
efficiency and welfare, and equally to distrust blind recipes and formulaic policies for 
enhancing welfare. 
Drawing from these lessons, this article has examined the limitations of the property 
regime within the knowledge domain. The route taken has been essentially that of a 
positive rather than a normative analysis, though some aspects of the latter do also 
emerge as a consequence of many of the points discussed herein. Property rights are 
“genetically” designed for managing economic resources where excludability plays a 
significant role in regulating use of the resource or avoiding its depletion. Accordingly, 
the central feature of the property system is to permit internalisation of the externalities, 
so as to make the market the better solution for fostering social welfare in accordance 
with the laissez-faire tradition. The market, with its integrity thus restored, will then be 
able to allocate the resources to those who value them most, thereby attaining a socially 
optimal outcome.
However, in certain situations the workings of the property-rights system may produce a 
new kind of externality, one which itself entails a social cost and requires a specific 
remedy. This happens in the knowledge domain, where the property regime can give rise 
to three kinds of externalities, pertaining to: the consequences on the social norms and 
individual preferences which characterise creative and inventive milieus; the collective 
framework of knowledge production, whose idiosyncratic economies of scale and 
indivisibilities may be damaged by atomisation through property rights; and, finally, the 
behavioural  changes  prompted by the creation  of opportunities  for distorting  the 
competitive process and the market structure.
On the whole, the problem described has a self-referential character, since the property 
regime's attempt to remedy a market failure itself produces a new market failure, thus 
creating a vicious circle that is difficult to break. In a sense, we find that to some extent 
Coase meets Pigou, since a pure property-rights system cannot be envisaged without 
some state/regulatory intervention. 
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